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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Imperial mis-states the standard of review on appeal, by arguing that Niemela needed
to "marshall the evidence". The usual summary judgment standard of review applies. For
summary judgment purposes, regulatory compliance does not heighten the standard, which
is that all genuine issues of material fact go to the fact-finder. At trial, the fact of regulatory
compliance is considered in determining whether the product was defective. But at the
summary judgment stage, if there is any evidence to support a finding of defectiveness, then
the case should not be dismissed without trial.
Niemela clearly described a defective product, both in design and manufacture. The
Imperial mailbox had a knob that was too small, too shallow in depth, and insufficient
weight. The mailbox was constructed with holes and gaps that allowed rain and snow to bind
or freeze the hinge points. Due to the repetitive nature of Niemela's mail route, consisting
of over 600 Imperial mailboxes, it was only a matter of time before her hand gave out, which
it did. The trial court erred in deciding that Niemela had alleged no duty on Imperial to stop
selling these mailboxes, or to warn consumers who had already purchased them. It erred in
deciding that there was no evidence of defect in the mailboxes, by completely disregarding
Niemela's testimony. It erred in believing that Niemela's testimony did not rebut the
presumption of safety from compliance with federal regulations.
Imperial should not be allowed to raise a new argument on appeal, that Niemela
-1Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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cannot show medical causation. This requires a factual record, which was not developed
because it was not raised below.
ARGUMENT
POINT ONE
NIEMELA HAS NO DUTY TO "MARSHALL THE EVIDENCE"
Imperial argues that "The Trial Court's factual findings cannot be challenged because
Niemela has failed to properly marshal all the evidence." Imperial misunderstands; Niemela
has no duty to "marshall the evidence". The trial court decided the case on summary
judgment. The appellate court "give[s] the [trial] court's legal decisions no deference,
reviewing for correctness, while reviewing the facts and inferences to be drawn therefrom
in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Dairy Prod. Servs., Inc. v. City of
Wellsville, 2000 UT 81, If 15, 13 P.3d 581." Gudmundson v. Del Ozone, 2010 UT 33, ^44;
232 P.3d 1059, 1070 (Utah 2010). It is only after trial of the case, when facts are "found",
that the marshalling the evidence requirement arises. See Paster, Gould, Ames & Weaver,
Inc. v. Morse, 887 P.2d 872 fn. 1 (Utah App. 1994)("On appeal from a bench trial, we view
the evidence in a light most favorable to the trial court's findings, and recite the facts
accordingly. Lake Philgas Serv. v. Valley Bank, 845 P.2d 951, 953 n. 1 (Utah App. 1993)").
This is because the trial court, after a bench trial, has had the opportunity to view witnesses
in a manner that the appellate courts do not. As the Utah Supreme Court recently explained:
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"A trial court decides [summary judgment] on the basis of a cold paper record. Since the trial
court has no comparative advantage over the appellate court in resolving these questions, the
appellate court reviews a summary judgment for correctness, giving no deference to the trial
court's decision, (footnotes omitted)". Bahr v. Imus, 2011UT19,20090646 (UTSC), 1f 12-18.
The case of Chen v. Stewart, 2004 UT 82, 100 P.3d 1177 (Utah 2004) cited by
Imperial, was an appellate review of the granting of injunctive relief, after a plenary
evidentiary hearing, with the trial court sitting as the finder of fact. In this case, Imperial has
asked that a jury hear the evidence and act as the finder of fact. This is in complete accord
with the Bahr case, supra. Because the trial court here did not hear evidence, Niemela's
claims should be reviewed de novo,
POINT TWO
NIEMELA'S TESTIMONY ABOUT THE DEFECTS IN THE IMPERIAL
MAILBOX SET FORTH MATERIAL FACTS WHICH A JURY COULD
CONCLUDE REBUTTED ANY PRESUMPTION ARISING FROM
COMPLIANCE WITH GOVERNMENT REGULATIONS
Regardless ofwhich set of regulations applies, either the 1992 or the 2001 regulations,
compliance with regulations only creates a presumption that a product is not defective.
Egbert v. Nissan North America, Inc., 167 P.3d 1058 (Utah 2007). Due to the date of this
case, this is a common law presumption, rather than a statutory presumption. Egbert v.
Nissan Motor Co., Ltd., 2010 UT 8, 228 P.3d 737 (Utah 2010).
The evidence recited by Niemela is sufficient to create a jury question whether the
-3Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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mailbox was defective, either in design or manufacture. Buhler v. Maddison, 109 Utah 267,
176 P.2d 118 (Utah 1947)(error to remove case from jury, whether defendant employer
rebutted presumption of negligence). While the burden of proof remains with Niemela, the
fact of regulatory compliance is simply evidence from which the jury can conclude nondefectiveness. It does not create a safe harbor provision, where compliance precludes
liability. See Fretz v. Anderson, 5 Utah 2d 290, 301-303; 300 P.2d 642, 650 (Utah
1956)(presumption of survival may be rebutted with "some evidence" to the contrary);
Sorenson v. Kennecott-Utah Copper Corp., 873 P.2d 1141 (Utah App. 1994)(factual question
for trial whether employee rebutted presumption of at-will employment);The Cantamar,
LLC

v. Champagne, 2006 UT App 321, 142 P.3d 140 (Utah App. 2006)(summary

judgment reversed where there was evidence to rebut presumption of integration of contract).
The litany of problems posed by the small knob Imperial mailbox is sufficient to
create an issue of fact as to defective design. "Defective" means "dangerous to an extent
beyond which would be contemplated by the ordinary and prudent. . . user of that product
in that community considering the product's characteristics, propensities, risks, dangers, and
uses.. .".U.C.A. §78-15-6(2)(1977).Niemelaneedonlypersuadeajury,by a preponderance
of the evidence, that the small knob Imperial mailbox was defective. Egbert v. Nissan North
America, Inc., 167 P.3d 1058, 1062; 2007 UT 64, ^14-17. The list of problems includes:
1) knob diameter too small
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2) knob depth too shallow
3) holes in top of mailbox not sealed to prevent water intrusion and ice buildup at
hinge
4) exposed joint between door and box allows direct entry of water to form ice
These problems result in a mailbox that is "dangerous to an extent beyond which would be
contemplated by the ordinary and prudent. . . user". This point is highlighted by the stark
difference between the Imperial mailbox in question and the Imperial mailbox with the
larger, deeper knob. It is also highlighted by the difference between the Imperial mailbox in
question and the ordinary aluminum mailboxes. Neither of these other designs created any
problem for Niemela in delivery.
Imperial argues that "the [tjrial [cjourt correctly concluded that the 1992 Model
Mailboxes were free from defect or defective condition". Imperial Brief, p. 11. This is a jury
question, however. Imperial argues that the only evidence that the Imperial mailboxes were
defective was the 2001 regulations. This is not correct. Niemela has testified in detail about
the defects in the mailboxes. Whether analyzed under the 1992 standards or the 2001
standards, Niemela's testimony stands in rebuttal to any presumption, and created a jury
question whether the mailboxes were defective. This was a jury question, not one for the
judge to "find".
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POINT THREE
IMPERIAL INCORRECTLY FRAMES THIS CASE IN TERMS OF
"DUTY" RATHER THAN "NEGLIGENCE"
Imperial argues that it owed no duty to Niemela regarding a "non-defective 1992
Model Mailbox". Imperial Brief, p. 13-14. This is a confusing mischaracterization of
Niemela's lawsuit. Niemela had alleged and supported with evidence a claim that the
mailbox, whether under the 1992 standard or the 2001 standard, was a defective product.1
This is based upon a manufacturer's hornbook law duty to be responsible for defective
products that cause injury, whether by defective design or manufacture.
Niemela does not argue that this duty extends to recalling non-defective products, due
to intervening advances in technology. See, e.g., Slisze v. Stanley-Bostich, 1999 UT 20,979
P.2d 317. The change from a 3/4 inch knob to a 1 lA inch knob was not due to some 21 st
century advance in metallurgy. It did not make an already safe mailbox safer. It did make an
unsafe mailbox safe for use by postal earners.
POINT FOUR
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT HAVE "BROAD DISCRETION" TO
IGNORE NIEMELA'S FIRST-HAND TESTIMONY ABOUT THE
WAYS THAT THE 1992 SMALL KNOB MAILBOX WAS DEFECTIVE

1

The exact dates of purchase and/or installation of the mailboxes are not apparent from
the record, making it impossible for the trial court to decide that the 2001 regulations were
inapplicable. Niemela's testimony suggests that they were purchased prior to 2001 and installed
as the subdivision was developed.
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Imperial suggests that Niemela' s "opinions and allegations were rej ected by the Court
within its broad discretion". Imperial Brief, p. 13. But Imperial waived that argument by
failing to make a motion to strike Niemela's deposition or affidavit. Niemela was competent
to give her own report of her experience with the mailboxes. Imperial fails to articulate why
Niemela's personal experiences with the mailboxes were not admissible. It is not enough for
Imperial to call her testimony "inadmissible subjective belief, when it is an actual account
of her personal experiences. This is like saying that a driver's testimony that the light was red
is just an "inadmissible subjective belief. Niemela's testimony does not purport to be a
"belief, but is a factual account. Trial courts do not have "broad discretion" to reject firsthand, relevant testimony, absent some other basis for objection.
Imperial complains that Niemela lacked the "foundation or expertise necessary to
opine on the design elements of the 1992 Model Mailbox, the standards within the industry,
or the medical expertise to opine regarding causation." Imperial Brief, p. 18. Imperial
mischaracterizes her testimony as expert opinion in order to disregard it. Niemela's statement
that water got into the hinge and flange, and froze shut, preventing the door from "operating
freely", was not expert opinion, but a factual statement. Her statement that she had to use a
screwdriver to pry open the mailbox doors with more than 5 lbs of force is a factual
statement, not an expert opinion. Her description that the mailbox door had "catch or binding
points" is a factual statement. Her statement that the shallow depth door knob did not allow
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"quick grasping" by her is a factual statement. Her complaint that the shallow depth door
knob did not provide her with adequate "finger clearance and surface area [to] grasp" is a
factual report of her personal experience. Her comparison of the shallow depth knobs and the
larger, heavier and deeper knobs, provides a compelling basis for her to describe the
problems with the earlier, smaller knobs. Her personal experience with the mailboxes gave
her the necessary basis to describe the problems with how the mailboxes worked.
Niemela never assumed she could testify as an expert about the "standards within the
industry". She is relying upon the governmental standards in 1992 and 2001 to show that.
Because there are governmental standards already set forth, expert testimony is not required
to show what those standards would be. Her lay testimony is sufficient to show how the
mailboxes deviated from the standards set by the government. Imperial also suggests that
Niemela "submitted an affidavit that contradicted her deposition". Id. However, Imperial
fails to explain what those contradictions are, and did not move to strike the deposition
testimony or the affidavit from the record.
Utah courts have allowed circumstantial evidence to prove product defect, without
expert testimony. These cases were reviewed and followed in Taylor v. Cooper Tire &
Rubber Co., 130 F.3d 1395 (10th Cir. 1997). Here there is abundant circumstantial evidence,
in the form of Niemela's extensive experience with the two versions of Imperial mailbox.
The issues are not complex. Anyone who has used a standard mailbox will understand. The
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standards are already developed through governmental regulation. There is no reason to
ignore this evidence in order to dismiss for failure to hire an expert witness. In fact, it is not
even clear that an expert could add anything substantial to this specific case.
The trial court erred by disregarding, in toto, Niemela's testimony and affidavit, and
in dismissing her claims for failure to hire an expert witness.
POINT FIVE
IMPERIAL FAILS TO EXPLAIN WHY IT SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO
RAISE MEDICAL CAUSATION AS A NEW ARGUMENT ON APPEAL
Imperial threw into its Brief the argument that there was no medical causation. Id., p.
14. Imperial did not submit any medical evidence to support an alternative theory of
causation. Imperial did not depose any of Niemela's medical providers to explore their
opinions. In fact, Imperial's motion for summary judgment does not mention medical
causation at all, nor did its reply memorandum in support of summary judgment. As a result,
Niemela did not respond to that issue, and the record is nearly silent on it.
The appellate courts do not generally address arguments raised for the first time on
appeal. In certain circumstances, if a legal ground is apparent on the face of the record, and
there is no reason to believe that factual development would change the result, appellate
courts do occasionally reach an issue to affirm. This is usually called affirming on any basis.
But to do so here would be especially prejudicial, where the plaintiff has no opportunity to
submit facts into the record on a challenged issue. This is not a legal issue but a factual one.
-9Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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The record reflects that Niemela testified of a direct sequence of events, she pulled
hard on a frozen mailbox knob, and she suddenly felt pain that never remitted. This is not a
case where a plaintiff claims to have gotten cancer from a manufacturer's pollution of
groundwater. This is like the plaintiff who trips and falls, breaking a wrist. The medical cause
and effect was never really challenged by Imperial below and it is apparent even to a lay
person. Such an argument should not be allowed to arise for the first time on appeal.
CONCLUSION
Niemela described in detail the specific ways that the Imperial mailboxes were
defective. They had a knob that was too small around, too lightweight, and which had too
little depth. They were poorly manufactured, with holes that allowed ice to form, freezing the
mailbox doors shut. This evidence sufficed to create a genuine issue of material fact, whether
the mailboxes were negligently designed, or negligently manufactured. That same evidence
created a genuine issue of material fact whether the mailboxes were defective, and
unreasonably dangerous to a consumer like Niemela, rebutting any presumption from prior
compliance with regulation. This was not a situation where a manufacturer replaced one nondefective product with another non-defective product. Niemela clearly explained how the
design changes adopted in 2001 eliminated the problems with the prior design. The earlier
Imperial mailboxes were unreasonably dangerous. Imperial should have stopped selling them
by November 1,2000, at the very latest. It should have warned consumers to fix the ones that
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were in the distribution chain, but not installed, to install the newer, larger knob. Imperial did
nothing but pocket its profits. Summary judgment should be reversed.
DATED this 4th day of May, 2011.
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